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We study the long standing issue of whether markets can supply banks with
sufficient liquidity or whether markets should be complemented with a lender of
last resort (LOLR). For this purpose, we develop an extended version of the recent
model of Holmström and Tirole (1998) on the supply of liquidity to firms.
H&Ts original model analyses liquidity supply to firms that are facing
solvency shocks. We apply their framework to banking and extend the framework
to admit the analysis of problems associated with transitory liquidity outflows,
even absent any change in a bank’s value. Our premise is that the scope for moral
hazard may increase in connection with liquidity outflows. Moral hazard, which
we interpret as the possibility of laxity in banks’ monitoring of firms, may
increase with liquidity outflows because banks need to increase their monitoring
efforts in order to safeguard their own interests.
The model illustrates many key aspects the classical LOLR debate. The model
shows how moral hazard limits of banks’ ability to borrow from markets to cover
liquidity outflows. It also predicts banks’ demand for liquid reserves and the
economies associated with centralization of reserves in a liquidity pool when the
holding of liquid reserves entails opportunity costs. Finally, the model enables
discussion of viable lending policies for the LOLR and contrasts these with the
‘Bagehotian principles’, which are still widely used as benchmark criteria in
evaluating LOLR operations.
Key words: liquidity, lender of last resort, banking, central banking
JEL classification numbers: E 58, G 21.4
Markkinat, reservit ja hätärahoittajat pankkien
likviditeetin lähteinä




Työssä tarkastellaan klassista kysymystä, tarvitseeko pankkisektori hätärahoitta-
jan (lender of last resort, LOLR). Kysymystä lähestytään teoreettisesti yritysten
likviditeettipolitiikkaa käsitelleen Holmströmin ja Tirolen (1998) mallin laajen-
nuksen avulla.
Mallissa pankit saattavat ajautua epälikvidiin tilaan paitsi kokiessaan kannat-
tavuussokkeja myös pyrkiessään löytämään rahoittajaa väliaikaisille likviditeetti-
tarpeilleen. Lähtökohtanamme on, että moraalikato-ongelmat vaikeutuvat likvidi-
teettivajausten sattuessa. Pankkien tulisi tiivistää luottoasiakkaidensa valvontaa,
kun nämä kokevat likviditeettisokkeja ja hakevat lisärahoitusta pankeilta. Pankin
asiakasvalvonnan laatua on ulkopuolisten vaikeata todentaa. Kun tallettajien usko
pankin harjoittamaan valvontaan horjuu, pankki ajautuu epälikvidiin tilaan.
Malli selventää monia hätärahoitustoimintaan liittyviä keskeisiä kysymyksiä.
Se selittää, miksi pankki saattaa olla kyvytön hankimaan riittävästi rahoitusta
tallettajilta. Se auttaa ymmärtämään reservien keräämisen motiiveja sekä niitä
hyötyjä, joita reservien keskittämisellä (hätärahoittajan luomisella) on saavutetta-
vissa. Mallin avulla voidaan keskustella hätärahoituksen klassisten kriteereiden,
ns. ‘Bagehotin periaatteiden’, asianmukaisuudesta.
Asiasanat: likviditeetti, hätärahoitus, pankki, keskuspankki
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We study the long-standing issue of the need for a lender of last resort for the
banking sector. The issue revolves around the following key questions:
1.  Will free exchange of liquidity in the markets rescue banks when they are
worth rescuing?
2.  Can the establishment of a central liquidity pool improve upon the
decentralised solution, in which each bank holds sufficient reserves in its
balance sheet?
3.  What are the optimal lending policies of a liquidity pool?
4.  Should banks be aware, ex ante, of the policy of the pool?
5.  Is there a role for public intervention in operating the liquidity pool?
In this paper we will analyse questions 1–4. Question 5, which is obviously
crucial for the design of central banks’ reserve and discount policies, is analysed
in a forthcoming paper.
We approach the problem via an extended version of the model of Holmström
and Tirole (H&T 1998) on the supply of liquidity to firms. In our model, banks
have three alternative ways to deal with the possibility of liquidity shocks. First,
they can rely on borrowing from the markets secondly they can hold liquid
reserves; and third they can rely on a liquidity pool (such as a central bank). The
latter alternative requires making a reserve deposit to the pool (or the central
bank) in return for liquidity insurance.
Our model uses moral hazard as the basis for its explanation of the limits of
banks’ ability to borrow from markets to cover liquidity outflows. This gives rise
to the demand for liquid reserves by banks, and the economies of centralising the
reserves to a liquidity pool when the holding of liquid reserves entails opportunity
costs. The model also illustrates the potential benefits of the right to issue legal
tender. Finally, the model enables us to discuss the viable lending policies of the
central liquidity pool.
The debate on the need for an LOLR for the banking sector started in the
1800s in England in connection with several situations in which the Bank of
England was allowed to deviate from its banknote cover regulations in order to
help the banking sector overcome liquidity drains. In a contemporary analysis,
Walter Bagehot
1 spelled out the classical principles for LOLR assistance:
– lend freely during a crisis
– assist any and all sound borrowers
– lend against all acceptable collateral
– apply penalty rates for assistance
– assure the markets in advance
Bagehot felt that to lend freely to all against good collateral and to assure the
markets of this in advance was necessary in order to maintain public confidence in
the financial system. Collateral should always be accepted at its value obtaining in
‘normal times’. The reasoning behind imposition of penalty rates is to discourage
                                                
1 Original edition Bagehot (1873); our version Bagehot (1910, pp 175, 198-200).8
risk taking, and unnecessary use of the system and to provide a ‘carrot’ for the
central bank to supply LOLR assistance.
Bordo (1990) identifies four main schools of thought in the on-going debate
on LOLR. The classical position, in line with Bagehot, supports the principles
presented above. The ‘financial stability’ school (often identified with Charles
Goodhart, eg 1995) maintains that it may be optimal to provide LOLR loans to
both solvent and insolvent banks. The free banking school does not see a need for
a public LOLR but does not rule out private LOLR arrangements (Selgin 1996).
The ‘monetary policy school’ (eg Goodfried and King 1988) does not admit of a
need for LOLR assistance to individual institutions. Goodfried and King
specifically argue against central banks as LOLRs because they are not likely to
have an information advantage over other market participants concerning a bank’s
financial condition.
Theoretical models rationalize LOLR activity via incomplete information
considerations. An LOLR is one potential tool for eliminating bank runs due to
coordination failure by depositors. The fear that collapse of the financial system,
eg via bank-to-bank contagion of problems, may lead to significant welfare loss
has been used to rationalize LOLR activity by central banks. Imperfections in the
functioning of markets may give rise to a need for an LOLR.
2
The very important recent contribution of Holmström and Tirole has shown
how to analyze the question from the market imperfection perspective. H&T
argue that adverse shocks, which reduce the value of firms, may jeopardize a
firm’s ability to obtain external financing on demand even though the firm may
still have positive continuation value. The markets for liquid funds do not work
perfectly because moral hazard reduces a firm’s pledgeable value. Outside
investors should optimally commit liquid funds to the firm ex ante, which the firm
can use as a reserve buffer (reserves) for liquidity shocks.
After demonstrating the inability of markets to supply liquidity in sufficient
quantities,
3 Holmström and Tirole demonstrate the existence of economies in
pooling reserves compared with a situation in which each firm holds liquidity in
its own balance sheet. Economies in reserve pooling can be used as rationale for
an institution (such as a bank) to provide liquidity insurance to firms.
4 We argue
analogously that one can rationalize an LOLR as a liquidity insurance scheme for
the banking sector.
In H&Ts original model, the shock is a loss of value to the firm (a solvency
shock). However, a theory of LOLR should, in line with the classical debate, also
analyse the potential role of the LOLR in financing transitory liquidity outflows.
Is there a role for a central bank in ensuring that transitory liquidity problems do
not force banks to liquidate valuable investment projects?
A hypothesis that adverse shocks to bank value are a potential source of
liquidity problems in banking and that LOLR arrangements serve as buffers
against such value shocks is not contrary to empirical observation: during banking
crises solvency and liquidity problems generally coexist.
5 However, common
                                                
2 See Bank of England (1999) for an extensive review.
3 See Bhattacharya and Gale (1987) for an alternative approach. They base the incomplete markets
hypothesis on a free riding argument.
4 As H&T note, the model is not specific about the type of institutional arrangement required for
governance of the pool.
5 See eg Kindleberger (1978), Schwartz (1986), Bordo (1986), Lindgren, Garcia, Saal (1998),
Herrala (1999) for descriptions of banking crisis episodes.9
wisdom in banking concerning potential causes of illiquidity seems to hold that
illiquidity may have broader origins than merely adverse developments in bank
value. Traditionally, bankers and bank supervisors have categorized liquidity
crises on the basis of whether they were caused by a bank’s solvency problems or
were ‘pure liquidity crises’. Nowadays, this distinction is considered misleading,
It is recognized that any liquidity crisis – whether stemming from suspicions
concerning a bank’s financial condition or other factors – could, in the end, to
jeopardize banks’ solvency.
6
We extend the H&T model to allow banks to experience problems in raising
liquidity in connection with transitory liquidity outflows, absent any change in the
value of a bank. Our premise is that the scope for moral hazard may be increased
in connection with liquidity outflows. Moral hazard, which we interpret as the
possibility of laxity in banks monitoring of firms, may increase with outflows of
liquidity because in that case banks would need to increase their monitoring
efforts in order to safeguard their own interests.
Our analysis starts with a description of the basic setup of the model. We then
proceed to analyse the properties of optimal policy by the bank, as determined by
the contract between the bank and outside investors. We show that the optimal
policy entails pre-hoarding of reserves. We then investigate the implementation of
the policy and discuss the potential benefits of pooling reserves and the right to
issue legal tender. Finally we contrast the model with the classical LOLR model
and discuss some areas for future research.
2 The model
In the model, a single good can be used for both consumption and investment.
Two groups of agents are the main focus of interest, banks and depositors. Both
types of agents are risk neutral and have additive and separable utility functions
over non-discounted consumption streams, ie they are unbiased as regards the
timing of consumption. An unlimited number of firms have projects with positive
net present value but with insufficient own-funds to complete the projects. The
banks (but not depositors) have access to a constant returns to scale lending
technology, which they can use to provide financing for the projects of the firms.
There are three periods (t = 0,1,2).
Chart 1. 2UGHULQJRIHYHQWVLQWKHPRGHO













                                                
6 Materials on banks’ and supervisors’ views on this issue were kindly made available to the
author by the Finnish Financial Supervision Authority.10
In period zero, a bank and some depositors negotiate a contract on a banking
project. The contract specifies:
– the amount to be invested in loans (L) in period zero,
– a continuation policy (l) which determines whether the banking project will
continue in period 2 or end in period 1 with zero payoff, and
– a distribution of period 2 returns from the banking project, with the bank’s
share being Rb and depositors’ share Rd.
After this policy choice is made, the bank proceeds to grant loans to firms from its
own funds and from the outside funds provided by depositors. Lending to firms
can be made at any scale. For period 0 lending, the bank has at its disposal own
funds A. We denote by D the amount collected by the bank from depositors. The
return requirement for depositors’ funds is normalized to 0. During this initial
period the bank can also invest in liquid reserves (z) if the continuation policy
requires that the bank should be able to withstand liquidity shocks in period 1 that
exceed the amount the bank can raise by leveraging itself up in period 1.
In period 1, firms in need of extra liquidity to finish their investment projects,
turn to the bank for extra liquidity. Subsequently, the bank faces a liquidity shock,
which is assumed to be proportional to the amount initially invested in loans
(r L). The liquidity shock parameter r is drawn from a continuous distribution
f[r], assumed nonzero in the positive domain. Banks can potentially raise
liquidity for firms by either leveraging themselves up with depositor funds or by
selling liquid reserves.
We will investigate two cases as regards the feasible region of continuation
policy. A binary continuation policy (l=0 means default in period 1, and l=1
means continue to period 2) refers to a situation in which the bank needs to cover
the whole liquidity shock or else it will default. Default yields zero payoffs for
both the bank and the depositors. A continuous lÎ[0,1] refers to a situation where
the banking project can ‘continue partially’, ie the bank can reject part of the
liquidity shock (discontinue part of its loan portfolio in period 1, with zero
payoff), while keeping some loans until maturity. One may interpret this as
meaning that the case that obtains depends on whether or not the bank has pre-
committed to supply firms with liquidity. Since both types of arrangement
empirically exist between banks and firms, we will investigate both cases.
In the final period (2), the bank chooses the level at which it will monitor the
firms to which it has granted loans. There are two alternatives: good banking with
adequate monitoring, and bad banking with no monitoring. The good strategy
results in a probability pH of successful completion of the banking project and the
bad strategy a success probability pL < pH . Unmonitored firms tend to engage in
riskier projects than monitored firms.
After this choice of monitoring level, returns from the loan portfolio are
realized. Verifiable returns from lending are RL (R = (r + a1r), r > 1) in the good
state of the world (project is successful) and zero in the bad state of the world.
The ‘recovery parameter’ a1, 0 < a1 < 1/pH denotes the expected recovery of the
liquidity outlay in period 2 in the good state of the world. A private benefit BL
(B = (1 + a2r)b), which is the savings from monitoring, accrues to the bank if it
chooses the bad strategy. The ‘incentive parameter’ a2, 0 < a2 < 1 captures the11
idea that a bank needs to increase its loan-portfolio monitoring when firms’
liquidity problems increase.
7
Finally, costs related to implementation of continuation policy effect the
viability of the banking project. Banks will be able to leverage themselves up with
funds from the depositors on period one to the level, where the continuation value
of the bank for the depositors is greater than the default value (zero). We call this












































A bank may implement a continuation policy, which requires it to supply liquidity
to firms in excess of the depositor threshold, by hoarding reserves (z L) on period
zero. We denote by q ³ 1 the price of a liquid asset of unit size. Then, (q – 1)z is
the liquidity cost of a continuation policy, which requires a bank to be able to
clear shocks up to the level rL = rD + z per unit of lending.
To sum up, the banking project in our model has the following return matrix
8:
Good banking strategy Bad banking strategy










Expected net returns pH(r+a1r)L – (1+r)L –
(q – 1)zL
pL(r+a1r)L + (1+a2r)bL –
(1+r)L – (q – 1)zL
We will assume throughout the analysis, that monitored lending to firms
according to the good banking strategy carries positive net present value
9 for the
bank, but unmonitored lending according to the bad banking strategy does not:
                                                
7 That a2 > 0 can be rationalised from the premise that banks need to increase monitoring of firms
with the leverage of the firm to ensure that entrepreneurs increase their (private) effort in line with
the demands of the situation (see for example Holmström and Tirole 1997). Such a view could
also be based on the empirical observation that monitoring of loan clients becomes more costly as
the amount lent to the clients approaches the pledgeable value of the client.
8 The model of H&T is given by the special case a1 = 0 and a2 = 0.
9 This return cannot be competed away by the banks because under moral hazard a positive rate of
return for the banker is a prerequisite for the feasibility of the banking project (see below).12
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For further reference, (2.3) implicitly defines the feasible range of values for r, b
and Dp.
Under (2.2), the banker needs to be given incentives to choose the good










In what way does our model of the banking project relate to the theory of
banking? In our model, a bank is a liquidity provider to firms and a monitor. The
role of a bank as a liquidity provider to firms can be rationalised from first
principles as in H&T. We use (in chapter 4.2) analogous reasoning to rationalise a
LOLR as a liquidity pooling arrangement to banks. The ability of a bank to
economise on monitoring firms has been illustrated by Diamond (1984). These
two roles of a bank combined give a banking project a similar temporal structure
that the projects of firms have in H&Ts model (initial investment at t = 0, the
liquidity shock at t  =  1 and, returns at t  =  2). We do abstract from the widely
studied issue of bank runs: a liquidity shock in our model is an increase in the
demand for liquidity by the loan clients of the bank.
10
3 Optimal policy
3.1 Policy at bank level when partial continuation is not
possible
In this chapter our aim is to show that a bank cannot rely on depositors to leverage
itself up on period 1 to sufficient degree. It is optimal for the bank to collect liquid
reserves at the start of the game. Liquid reserves function as insurance against the
possibility for permanent and or transitory liquidity outflows on the middle
period, which may endanger the ability of the bank to continue to the final period.
We will solve for the optimal policy of the bank by maximising the expected
return from the project to the banker, with respect to the return requirement for
depositors, and the incentive compatibility constraint of the banker.
                                                
10 See Diamond and Dybvig (1983) for an analysis of the deposit contract.13
[][][]
() [] () {} [][]




- ³ - - r r r l r - r - r a +







b ) 1 (
R ii
A L z ) 1 q ( L d f R r p L i t . s







H R , , I f
(3.1)
Function U in (3.1) is the expected value of the banking project for the banker, net
of the banker’s initial outlays to the banking project. Condition (i) is the return
requirement of depositors. It states that expected project returns, diluted by the
share of the banker and the costs of implementing the continuation policy must
not be smaller than depositor outlays in the bank. (ii) is the incentive compatibility
constraint of the banker. Choice variables in the problem are the size of lending
(L ³ 0),  cut-off  policy  (here  binary:  l = 1  for  continue  and  or  l = 0  for
discontinue), and the banker’s share of total returns (Rb[r]).
To simplify (3.1) note that, as U is linearly increasing in L, condition (i) must
be binding or the problem will have a solution where the bank’s loan portfolio is
infinite in size. We proceed with the assumption that the depositor return
requirement holds with equality. A necessary condition for this is, that the left
hand side of (i) (value of the bank for depositors) grows more slowly than the
right hand side (deposits) as the size of the bank gets larger. It is sufficient, that
the expected marginal unit value of the bank is less than one for depositors at it’s
maximum. To achieve this, we make the following assumption:
[] 1 d f
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The upper bound of the integral is the depositor threshold (see (2.1)). (3.3)
implies, that the marginal returns from banking must not be sufficient to finance
both the incentive compatible share of the banker, and the return requirement of
depositors, else optimal bank size grows towards infinity. This condition rules out
self-financing of the banking project.
Inserting (i) (as equality) into U one notices, that banker utility is maximised
with minimum incentive compatible payoffs so that we can also regard (ii) to hold
with equality.
We also need to establish a link between continuation policy and the level of
reserves carried by a bank. Note that any z enables continuation up to rL = z + rD.
It can be verified (as a solution to (3.1)), that the value of continuation is
decreasing in r, so that continuation will optimally be up to some threshold
liquidity shock. We can, therefore, replace l with an upper bound rL in the
integral terms, and set z = (rL – rD).
After these steps, and after some manipulation, we can express problem (3.1)
in the following form:14
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We see that the problem, in fact, entails maximising the expected share of the
banker in project returns (denominator of second term in parenthesis in (3.3)) in
proportion to the share of the banker in initial outlays.
From (3.3) we can deduce that the discontinuation threshold will optimally be
at or above the depositor threshold. Recall that for the pair (a1, a2) = (1/pH, 0) we
get an infinite depositor threshold so that (3.3) is not well defined. For other cases,
at and below rD both the numerator and the denominator (in the right term in
parenthesis) are positive by assumption (3.2), the numerator is increasing and the
denominator is non-decreasing. U must, therefore, be increasing up to and at rD.
We can also derive an upper bound for the discontinuation threshold from the
observation that, in optimum, the denominator cannot be growing faster than the
numerator.
Formally, the boundaries for the feasible region of the optimal discontinuation
threshold (r*) can be expressed as:
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where  r1 = pHr/(1 + pHa1) maximises problem (3.1) absent the incentive
compatibility constraint.
Solving for the first order condition for maximum of the discontinuation
threshold we get:
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(3.5) equates marginal unit costs from continuation with average unit costs from
continuation. It can be verified from a second order condition that (3.5) yields a
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The optimal discontinuation threshold cannot be solved explicitly from the first
order condition at this level of generality so that we cannot improve much on the
accuracy afforded by (3.4). (3.5) and (3.6) do, however, illustrate, that the15
optimum will be strictly greater than the depositor threshold whenever the
liquidity premium is not too large. This is because the right hand side of (3.5) is
positive at and below the depositor threshold. Only when the liquidity premium is
so large that marginal liquidity costs overstep average unit costs from
continuation after rD, will the optimal discontinuation threshold be rD.
All in all, the analysis shows that, under the assumption of binary
continuation and absent extreme values of the parameters, it will be optimal for
the bank to collect reserves. Reserves shield the bank against liquidity shocks
which decrease the value of the bank, and/or increase the moral hazard of the
banker. The bank will implement a continuation policy, which enables it to
continue beyond the depositor threshold because the utility of the banker is still
increasing at the margin at that point.
The optimal discontinuation threshold does never reach the first best
discontinuation level where the value of the bank is zero (under the good banking
strategy), because the banker requires a positive marginal return to choose the
good banking strategy. The bank should be discontinued before it has lost all
value.
3.2 Optimal policy at bank level with partial continuation
Partial continuation refers to a situation, where a bank may discontinue part of it’s
loan portfolio with zero payoffs, while keeping some until maturity. We interpret
this as referring to a case where a bank has not, a priori, committed to credit lines
for it’s loan clients.
We present the problem in a form, where the incentive compatibility
constraint is already included in the maximised function and the return
requirement of outside investors. We also show the border conditions for the now
continuous continuation function l. The continuation function can obtain values
in between zero (which denotes discontinuation of all banks) and one (all
continue). The upper bound must be smaller than one (part of banks continue),
whenever the amount of liquidity z is not sufficient to cover the shortfall of
liquidity  r – rD.
The problem to be maximised thus becomes:
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We again make the assumption, that (i) holds with equality to get finite
investment size. To solve the other endogenous variables, we use the Lagrangian
method, and denote by d the Lagrangian coefficient. It represents the marginal
value of wealth within the bank, and it’s value must therefore be above unity.16
As in the previous chapter with binary continuation, for the special case
a1 = 1/pH and a2 = 0 the solution for problem (3.7) becomes trivial. For other
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The second order derivative is always zero for this linear problem, but closer
inspection helps to verify that we do, again, have a maximum whenever liquidity
costs are not too large.
11 For q sufficiently large, the right hand side of (3.9) is
always negative, in which case we have z = 0 in optimum.
In other cases, (3.9) indicates that the bank allows at least some firms to
continue whenever the liquidity shock falls below the threshold value  r . The
bank utilises partial continuation for some liquidity shocks, else (3.9) cannot hold
(the continuation function must be increasing for (3.9) to hold).
We observe that the discontinuation threshold varies in the interval
1 D r < r < r
The lower bound is approached when the marginal value of wealth approaches
infinity (moral hazard increases), and the upper bound is approached when the
marginal value of wealth approaches one (its lower bound).
The bank will choose:
D z 0 r - r < <
All in all, then, the bank will choose to collect reserves even when partial
continuation is possible, unless liquidity costs are too high. Reserves enable
continuation fully up to some value above the depositor threshold. From this point
on there is a finite interval where the bank rations liquidity outlays to firms (it
resorts to partial continuation by liquidating a part of it’s portfolio). The bank is
discontinued (whole portfolio is liquidated) at some level below the first best.
                                                
11 The target function is graphically the area under a downward sloping line. The optimal
discontinuation threshold cuts the line at the interception with the x-axis. For maximum q is not so
large as to make the slope of the line positive.17
4 On the benefits of an LOLR
4.1 Reserves at bank level
The analysis in section 3 indicates that reserves are not needed, when the liquidity
shock is fully recovered and the liquidity shock does not affect the bankers’
incentives (a1 = 1/pH,  a2 = 0).  In  this  case,  the  depositor  threshold  is  infinite
irrespective of whether partial continuation is possible or not. A bank will always
be able to get enough funds from depositors on period 1 to continue. The optimal
policy can, then, be implemented with an arrangement, where depositors give the
bank the amount L on period zero against a claim on the bank’s returns on period
2. No reserves are needed for implementation of the policy.
In all other cases the depositor threshold is below the optimal discontinuation
threshold (r* – rD > 0, r  – rD > 0), given that liquidity costs are not too high.
Banks need to invest in reserve assets on period zero to implement the optimal
discontinuation threshold on period 1. In the following we investigate the issue,
whether banks can use inter bank assets as reserve assets alone, or whether
(costly) outside assets are needed as a reserve asset. We present a proof
12 that
inter bank assets cannot guarantee implementation for all parameter values of the
problem.
Inter bank assets are claims, issued on period t = 0 on the value of banks.
Banks can acquire such assets on period zero and sell them to obtain finance from
the outside investors on period 1. As inter bank assets are also sold to depositors
which have a zero return requirement, holding these assets cannot be costly. Inter
bank assets, therefore, are a potentially premium free reserve asset for the banking
sector.
Clearly, a portfolio of inter bank assets cannot be valuable as liquidity if
banks face synchronous shocks. This is because a bank needs to rely on reserve
assets as a source of liquidity only in circumstances when it does not have positive
outside value. If other banks are in an identical situation, the portfolio of inter
bank assets is valueless. Inter bank assets can be valuable reserve assets if banks
encounter idiosyncratic liquidity shocks. Then banks, which need liquidity, can
sell claims of other banks, which are still valuable to outside investors, to obtain
liquidity.
Nevertheless, we will show that, even if liquidity shocks are independently
distributed across banks, the optimal policy still cannot, in general, be
implemented in a decentralised setting utilising inter bank claims alone.
Consider the case with a binary continuation first.
Assume, that reserves of inter bank assets can provide banks with the means
to reach r*, when banks face idiosyncratic shocks. Consider a situation, where
bank a owns a share b < 1 of other banks, which we denote by b. Then, the resale
value S
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12 This extends the proof given by Holmström and Tirole (1998).18
Then, for bank a to reach r*, the following inequality must hold
a




































































Note, that the left-hand side of the inequality is always positive, and also
increasing in b whenever a2 > 0.The right hand side, on the other hand, decreases
as b increases. Within the boundaries determined by (2.3) it can be arbitrarily
close to zero for large enough b. For large b, then, inter bank assets will not
provide sufficient means to achieve the optimal discontinuation threshold for the
banking sector even in the case when shocks are idiosyncratic. It is easily verified
that an analogous proof can be utilised for the cases where a bank can utilise
partial continuation.
Therefore, under autarky, the policy must be implemented with outside assets.
Consider a situation, where implementation of the optimal policy (in line with
(3.5) or (3.9)) calls for a discontinuation threshold rD + z*. Then, optimal policy
can, in principle, be implemented so that investors invest (1  +  qz*)L–A in the
bank on period 0 with the covenant that the bank invests qz* in liquid outside
assets. It can sell these on period 1 to obtain z* liquidity and implement the cutoff.
Prices of liquid outside assets should be expected to carry a liquidity premium
(q > 1) at the markets if they provide a liquidity service.
13 An additional drawback
with hoarding of outside assets is that, as Holmström and Tirole (1998) argue, if
liquid assets are costly to hold, implementing the above policy in a decentralised
setting is complicated by the fact that liquidity is a public good. The equilibrium
at the market of liquid assets breaks down in the case, when obtaining or holding
these assets carries costs, as banks have an incentive not to invest directly in the
costly liquid asset, but to invest in the assets of other banks which hold the liquid
asset. This free rider problem could be overcome by the use of multiple securities
to discriminate in between outside investors and banks.
14
4.2 Pooling banks’ reserve assets
In this chapter we discuss potential gains from pooling banks’ reserve assets so
that liquidity policy can be implemented on the banking sector level. These
economies provide a rationale for a lender of last resort. We will demonstrate
                                                
13 See H&T 1998b for an analysis of the liquidity premium.
14 H&T’s idea is to price-discriminate investors, who value liquidity services differently.19
economies of reserve pooling with an example, where a group of (ex ante)
identical banks i pool liquid reserves.
The optimal policy of the pool can be solved from:
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The problem changes, in comparison to autarky (3.7), in the respect that we have
(iii) as the aggregate constraint for realised shocks across the banking sector on
period 1. We denote by ft=1 the realised distribution of shocks across banks.






= = r r r - r r
a
D













r r = r > r









z d f L : ˆ
p
b
p ) 1 ( p
p
b
) 1 ( r p
where
ˆ , min if 0
ˆ , min if 1
z ,
(4.4)
Reserve policy in aggregate implementation satisfies
[]




b ) 1 (
r p
p





































This, again, establishes a maximum, if q is not too high. (4.4) shows that the pool
will implement a ceiling  r above which no bank continues. When the aggregate
liquidity constraint binds, the pool will adjust this discontinuation threshold
downwards to r ˆ  to equate aggregate demand of liquidity with aggregate supply.
The pool achieves ex post efficient use of liquidity compared to autarky because,
when liquidity shocks are asynchronous across banks, the pool can use excess
liquidity of ‘lucky’ banks to support continuation of unlucky banks.
(4.5) shows that the pool will choose a level of reserves such that it expects
the aggregate budget constraint to bind (else the first term in (4.5) is zero). This
economises on liquidity costs. Note that reserve hoarding is based on the expected20
aggregate demand for liquidity, and not on expected demand on bank level. This
implies that the pool will achieve ex ante economies in hoarding reserves
whenever the expected realisation of liquidity shocks is not singular across banks.
All in all, the previous analysis shows that a LOLR would utilise the
possibility to implement ‘soft budget constraints’ for the banking sector on period
one. This results in ex ante economies in reserve hoarding, and ex post economies
in use of liquidity.
4.3 Legal tender
One might argue that a key characteristic of central banks, which makes them
ideal as LOLRs is their ability to issue legal tender. When the LOLR can issue
money which, by law, must be accepted as payment for debt, then the need to pre-
hoard costly reserves vanishes. Then, banks can use all available funds on period
zero for productive lending. The LOLR can inject legal tender to banks on
demand in period 1, which the banks can use to settle their liquidity shocks.
In H&Ts terminology, the right to issue legal tender makes it possible for the
LOLR to replicate a ‘state contingent bond’, the value of which follows the
demand for liquidity by banks. Optimal continuation policy can in this case be
solved from the following program
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Problem (4.6) is similar to (4.3) except that the liquidity cost term is absent in (i).
As (i) is binding by assumption, program (4.6) yields a higher level of utility than



































To verify that we do, indeed, have a maximum we can use similar reasoning as in
the section 3.2.
(4.7) illustrates the fact that the socially optimal cut-off will, again, be above
the depositor threshold and below the first best. We observe that, in fact, the21
LOLR will implement the same discontinuation threshold r as in the previous
case when reserve assets were needed (problem (4.3)). Recall that it was then
optimal to adjust the discontinuation threshold downwards to r ˆ  whenever
liquidity was in short supply. This is never optimal here as the issuer of legal
lender has the ability to create more liquidity.
We, therefore, see how the right to issue legal tender enables the LOLR to
reduce the costs of hoarding reserves. Banks will be able to invest all available
funds in lending and aggregate utility will be increased compared to the case
when costly reserves are used. One might ask, whether this state contingent bond
could be implemented at bank level. Banks traditionally had the right to issue
notes and one might think that such a right would allow banks to solve their
liquidity problems once and for all. We must, however, emphasize that the right to
issue legal tender means here that depositors must accept the ‘money’ issued by
the LOLR as payment for debt. Indeed, the right to enforcement is crucial here,
since we observe that depositors would like to close down the bank before the
optimal discontinuation threshold is reached (the optimal cut-off is above the
depositor threshold). Therefore, to give banks the right to issue notes would not
suffice to implement (4.7).
5 Discussion
To restate our main results about the sufficiency of markets as a source of
liquidity, and the role of the LOLR:
1. Banks may find it hard to finance even transitory liquidity shocks from the
markets if moral hazard problems are amplified by liquidity shocks.
2. There are economies in reserve pooling that arise from the ability of a pool to
implement soft budget constraints for banks experiencing liquidity shocks. An
ability to issue legal tender reduces liquidity costs further. The rationale for a
LOLR depends on these economies of centralization.
The view offered by the model on the economies of LOLR is obviously at odds
with the monetary-policy-school view, which holds that an LOLR cannot improve
on the market outcome. Goodfriend and King argue against LOLR on the premise
that central banks (as LOLRs) are not likely to have better information than
market participants on potential recipients of LOLR assistance. While our model
does not dispute this premise, it does indicate that an information advantage is not
a prerequisite for the economies associated with an LOLR arrangement, which
can be rationalized with its ability to distribute liquidity efficiently across banks.
Due to this ability, an LOLR can economize on reserve holdings (compared to
‘autarky’) when market transactions are constrained by moral hazard.
To get a better grip on the reasons behind this difference in opinion, consider
the situation in our model from the viewpoint of an outsider who observes only
period 1, when banks experience liquidity shocks. The outsider would observe
that some banks are in trouble because they need liquidity but cannot pay a
competitive return to the depositors. There is no apparent reason why an outsider,
eg a central bank, should support the bank so as to enable it to continue into22
period 2. The only one who would benefit from continuation is the banker, whose
payoff depends on the ability of the bank to continue.
The key to understanding the rationale for the LOLR scheme is to note that
the banker is willing to pay for the benefit of continuation.
15 There is scope for a
deal between the banker and outsiders (depositors). Such a deal cannot be
consummated when the trouble is at hand (in period 1) because the bank has
nothing quid pro quo to offer. However, back in period 0, the banker would have
been willing and able to trade some returns from the banking project for
protection against liquidity shocks in period 1. Reserve hoarding in period 0
serves as a means by which outsiders can commit to such a policy. Reserve
holding is costly and hence economies in reserve holding constitute a rationale for
the LOLR. Thus, while there is no apparent reason why outsiders should help the
bank when problems mount, it is optimal ex ante to establish an LOLR that is
committed to providing support.
The model offers a view on the debate between the Bagehotian classical
school and the financial stability school on whether LOLR assistance should be
given only to solvent institutions or to certain others as well. Recall that in our
model both banks and depositors have nonnegative expected returns from banking
projects in period zero negotiations. In this sense, our model prescribes that banks
participating in an LOLR scheme should be solvent ex ante.
In deciding whether a participating bank should receive LOLR assistance, the
issue is not really whether the bank has any value per se but whether its
continuation value is greater than its liquidation value. Another important insight
is that a bank’s continuation value differs for different interest groups (banker vs
depositors) when there is moral hazard. Indeed, our extension of the H&T
framework indicates that a bank’s continuation value may become negative for
the depositors even though the total value of the bank is unaffected. Optimally, a
bank should have the ability to continue beyond the point at which continuation
becomes unattractive for depositors but it should discontinue operations before its
continuation value is totally exhausted.
As regards the collateral policy of the LOLR, the classical school advocates
lending against all acceptable collateral, evaluated at normal-time value. The
exact meaning of normal-time value is an interesting issue. A postulate of our
model is that this is the bank’s pledgeable value prior to the onset of crisis rather
than during a crisis. The parties should commit to some continuation policy prior
to the crisis.
This said, we would re-emphasize that the model does not support the
postulate that collateral policy could help an LOLR to recover some of the
injected funds from the receivers. LOLR assistance is needed only after the
pledgeable (outside) value of a bank has been exhausted. A similar issue arises
when one tries to rationalize the application of the Bagehotian principle regarding
penalty rates in the context of our model. One is led to ask why a bank would
need an emergency loan at all if it has collateral to offer and it can pay above-
market rates for it.
16 To rationalize such a facility, one may need to resort to the
                                                
15 Recall that in the model the incentive-compatible payoff of the bank is strictly positive. The
bank has ‘going concern’ value but this cannot be pledged due to moral hazard. An alternative
modelling strategy to explain non-pledgenbility would be via adverse selection.
16 Fischer (1999) proposes that the penalty interest rate should include a margin over the rate at
‘normal times’ but then the bank could just as well buy some liquidity from the market at market
rates and receive some via an insurance payment from the LOLR.23
assumption that the an LOLR has an information advantage vs the markets in
respect to the recipient of LOLR assistance.
Finally, our model admits an interesting interpretation of the classical means
of assuring the markets in advance concerning the LOLR scheme. The issue here
is whether a central bank should make banks aware of the possibility that they
may get LOLR assistance. According to the model, the participants should be
aware of the LOLR’s policy (they should know that the pool acts as an LOLR).
Otherwise banks would keep their own reserves and economies of reserve pooling
would be lost. However, there may be ambiguity as to whether any particular
bank is allowed to continue given the shock that it has encountered. This is
because it may be optimal for the LOLR to implement a continuation policy
where the continuation of a bank depends on the aggregate demand for liquidity.
This facilitates efficient use of liquidity at system level.
We wish to emphasize some of the issues that the model leaves open. The
model abstracts from the incentive effects of LOLR schemes and is, likewise,
silent on the issue of who should function as the LOLR, ie a private clearing
house or a public institution such as the central bank. The model does, however,
suggest that a right to issue legal tender is useful for a LOLR. In a related vein,
the model is not rich enough to allow a proper treatment of monetary policy
issues.24
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